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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY

31 March 1960

EAST-WEST RELATIONS

De Gaulle - Khrushchev Talks

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[REDACTED]

The first series of talks between De Gaulle and Khrushchev were devoted to a repetition of basic positions on the German question and various aspects of disarmament.

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[REDACTED]

there had been no meeting of minds on Germany,

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[REDACTED]

Khrushchev tried to leave the impression, as he did with Italian President Gronchi in mid-February, that if the USSR does not obtain some satisfaction on the German question at the summit meeting, it will sign a separate peace treaty with East Germany. In his public statements in France, however, Khrushchev has avoided specifically linking the timing of a separate treaty to the outcome of the

May summit. In speeches on 25 and 29 March, he used the now-standard and vague formulation, threatening to take unilateral action "if all our possibilities are exhausted and our aspirations not understood."

De Gaulle opened the talks by disagreeing with Khrushchev's fears of West Germany and stressed that it was of "prime importance" that Bonn remain with the West in order to maintain the necessary "equilibrium" in Europe. Replying to the threat of a separate peace treaty, De Gaulle stated that France would not recognize East Germany and asked what the USSR could hope to gain by such a move.

In discussions on disarmament, De Gaulle reiterated his refusal to be bound by any nuclear test ban unless accompanied by a disarmament plan providing for destruction of nuclear weapons. Khrushchev attempted to appear responsive to French views by endorsing the priority of controls on nuclear delivery systems.

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In his speeches in Paris, Khrushchev continued the pattern of emphasizing the German menace and the "natural" French-Soviet alliance in containing it. Reflecting the impasse on the German question in their private talks, both De Gaulle and Khrushchev have engaged in some oblique public exchanges. At a dinner for Khrushchev on 23 March, the French President referred to the "unbounded" German ambition in two world wars "which has since then disappeared." Khrushchev seemed to reply the following day when he stated that he could not conceal his apprehension at the "tolerance and even encouragement of German militarism" or accept "attempts to prove that this militarism is something different from what it used to be."

Khrushchev, however, was more responsive to De Gaulle's remarks that the major international issues should be taken up "one by one with realism." Addressing the Diplomatic Press Association on 25 March, Khrushchev repeated his previous statements that all controversial issues cannot be solved in one or two summit meetings. He added that the main aim of the May meeting would be to find a "common language."

In an effort to appear accommodating to De Gaulle's views, Khrushchev also renewed his carefully worded endorsement of De Gaulle's 16 September program for a solution to the Algerian question. Khrushchev avoided rejecting multilateral aid to underdeveloped countries by tying this question to an agreement on disarmament, and he parried questions on an

arms embargo in the Middle East by repeating that the USSR would be willing to reach agreement that "no country should sell its arms to any other country."

French Reaction

French reaction to the visit has varied from large turnouts in Paris and Marseilles, where French Communist party efforts were evident, to cool receptions in Bordeaux and Rheims. In Paris, Khrushchev drew good but not tremendous crowds, but the receptions elsewhere have been enthusiastic only where French Communists have been able to organize the welcome. In Bordeaux the streets were nearly empty and the indifference of the population was noticeable, but at a stop in Trarbes the reaction was apparently enthusiastic.

The non-Communist Paris press described the visit to Marseilles as Khrushchev's "first triumph in France." Communist cheering sections were most prominent in Lille. At Rheims crowds were sparse. A French Foreign Ministry official feels that there has been "considerable genuine interest" in the provinces not inspired by the Communists.

Press reaction has ranged from reserve and detachment to open hostility, although most of the press accepts the talks as probably a useful prelude to the summit. Editorial comment has been increasingly critical of Khrushchev's stress on the German menace and hostile to advocacy of the need for a French-Soviet alliance. As a possible reflection of this reaction, Khrushchev during his tour of the southern

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provinces has concentrated on extolling Soviet economic and technical accomplishments, with only brief references to Germany. In Verdun, for example, he passed up an opportunity to recall French-Russian cooperation against Germany, but returned to the German theme again in Rheims.

Eastern Europe, and a Soviet official at the disarmament talks in Geneva recently referred to this possibility.

Other Pre-Summit Planning

Khrushchev may go to East Berlin to review the results of his talks with De Gaulle and strategy for the summit. He may also go to Czechoslovakia; [REDACTED]

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b3 Khrushchev has been in all of the satellites since his last visit to Czechoslovakia in July 1957, and there has been some friction in Czechoslovak-Soviet relations that may need soothing.

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b3 The main purpose of the coming session of the Supreme Soviet, announced for 5 May, will probably be to provide a forum for a demonstration of support for Khrushchev on the eve of the summit meeting. In addition to reaffirming basic positions on the issues to be taken up at the summit, Moscow may use the occasion for a further "peaceful initiative," such as an announcement of a reduction in Soviet troops in Eastern Europe. Khrushchev told [REDACTED]

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b3 [REDACTED] that the overall reduction in Soviet forces would be followed by a "proportionate" withdrawal from

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